In Robles v. Selective Insurance Co. of America, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 204595 (D. Mass. Sept. 2, 2025), Magistrate Judge Hennessy issued a report and recommendation granting in part and denying in part Selective’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in a Chapter 93A and Chapter 176D case arising from a fatal construction accident. The plaintiff alleged that Selective engaged in unfair settlement practices by failing to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement when liability became “reasonably clear.”  

First, the court dismissed all claims against two of the three Selective entities because the plaintiff’s Chapter 93A demand letter was addressed only to one insurer. The ruling underscores that a 93A demand letter should specifically identify each defendant and the alleged misconduct; failure to do so may foreclose recovery.

The court also struck all allegations of unfair practices beyond those expressly described in the demand letter, reaffirming that claimants cannot expand the scope of their 93A theories through later pleadings or correspondence. The court, however, allowed the 93A claim to proceed as to the alleged failure to tender policy limits for a release of the insured contractor, Turnkey, under §3(9)(f) of Chapter 176D. In doing so, the court noted that while insurers must offer fair settlements once liability is reasonably clear, they are not obligated to pay policy limits absent a full release of their insureds. However, the court found factual issues that precluded judgment at the pleadings stage.

For defense counsel, Robles highlights three key takeaways for consideration: (1) scrutinize and insist on strict compliance with the 93A demand letter requirement; (2) ensure that all correspondence clearly documents the scope and purpose of settlement offers; and (3) recognize that liability being “reasonably clear” is evaluated narrowly—insurers are protected when legitimate coverage or causation disputes exist. The decision reflects a view of Chapter 93A enforcement that preserves the insurer’s right to negotiate in good faith while limiting expansive post hoc claims of bad faith.