In Distefano v. Bank of America, N.A., the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed Chapter 93A claims arising from allegedly unauthorized transfers through the money-transfer application Zelle. The court determined that plaintiffs failed to plead actionable deception and did not satisfy the heightened pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) applicable to fraud-based claims. 

Plaintiffs alleged that approximately $48,000 was transferred from their bank account without authorization through Zelle. After reporting the transactions, plaintiffs alleged the bank initially informed them the transfers were unauthorized but later sent a letter stating that the withdrawals appeared to have been properly authenticated. Following receipt of a Chapter 93A demand letter, the bank refunded the disputed funds but declined to provide additional relief. Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit on behalf of themselves and a putative class asserting, among other claims, violations of Chapter 93A. 

Plaintiffs advanced two theories of liability. First, they alleged defendants misrepresented that Zelle was a safe platform for transferring money. Second, they alleged defendants falsely represented that the disputed transfers were authorized.

As a threshold matter, the court explained that Chapter 93A claims premised on allegations of intentional or malicious false statements are treated as fraud-based claims and must satisfy Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard. Because plaintiffs repeatedly characterized defendants conduct as “fraudulent,”, “false,” and “deceptive,” these claims sounded in fraud. Plaintiffs were therefore required to plead the circumstances of the alleged misconduct with particularity, including the “who, what, where, and when” of the alleged misrepresentation. 

Applying that standard, the court concluded that neither theory satisfied Rule 9(b).

First, the court rejected the theory that defendants falsely marketed Zelle as a safe platform or failed to disclose to consumers that it was unsafe. Plaintiffs did not allege that any specific representative of the defendants knew Zelle was unsafe despite marketing statements describing it as secure. The court characterized the alleged statements as non-actionable puffery rather than representations about specific product characteristics. Statements expressing a generalized view of a product’s safety or quality rather than describing a concrete attribute of the service are classic examples of puffery and cannot support a Chapter 93A claim. 

Second, the court rejected plaintiffs’ claims that defendants misrepresented to the plaintiffs that the transfers were authorized. Claims based on alleged misrepresentation require more than mere speculation about what a company should have known. Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that defendants actually knew that the statements were false or knew plaintiffs were entitled to reimbursement at the time the representations were made. 

Because plaintiffs failed to plead these fraud-based theories with the particularity required by Rule 9(b), the court dismissed the claims. 

This decision serves as a reminder that defendants confronting Chapter 93A claims in federal court should closely examine whether the allegations sound in fraud triggering Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard. When conduct is characterized as “fraudulent,” “false,” or “deceptive,” plaintiffs are required to plead more than mere speculation about what a defendant knew or should have known. Where they do not, federal courts in Massachusetts may be inclined to dismiss them at an early stage.