On March 31, 2026, the District of Massachusetts dismissed a pro se plaintiff’s Chapter 93A claim arising from alleged “unauthorized enrollment” in various utility and renewable energy programs in Ivanowski v. Viv Auto Pilot. The plaintiff claimed that multiple energy-related defendants enrolled her in programs without her consent, resulting in more than $300,000 worth of charges. Defendants moved to dismiss.  

Applying the four-part framework articulated in Rafferty v. Merck & Co. for Chapter 93A claims, the court focused on the threshold requirement that the plaintiff plausibly allege an “unfair or deceptive act or practice” in trade or commerce that caused injury. The court held that the plaintiff failed to allege specific facts demonstrating any actionable misconduct by any particular defendant. Although the plaintiff attached utility bills and asserted that the charges were fraudulent, the court found that the bills showed only that defendants had charged the plaintiff for metered services and enrolled her in certain programs; the court did not identify any false statement, deceptive representation, unauthorized enrollment mechanism, or other misconduct. At most, the allegations suggested a “mere possibility of misconduct,” which is insufficient under Twombly and Iqbal.

The court further explained that the Chapter 93A claim “sounded in fraud,” thereby triggering Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard. Because the plaintiff alleged fraudulent enrollment and deceptive billing, she was required to plead the “who, what, where, and when” of the alleged misconduct. She failed to identify any specific misrepresentation; the time or place of any fraudulent communication; the method by which she was enrolled; or the conduct attributable to any individual defendant. The court also emphasized the impermissibility of “group pleading” — the complaint referred to defendants collectively without differentiating their roles, which independently warranted dismissal. Further, the court noted that the pleading left outstanding questions over whether the plaintiff complied with Chapter 93A’s demand letter requirement. Though the plaintiff attached two purported demand letters to her complaint, they were not addressed to a specific defendant, did not include a mailing address, and appeared incomplete. The plaintiff failed to provide any indication that she sent the letters — or that defendants received them. 

The court dismissed the plaintiff’s Chapter 93A claim without prejudice for failure to satisfy both Rule 8(a)’s plausibility requirement and Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement. The court’s reasoning provides several takeaways: (1) documents alone may not establish deception absent factual allegations showing falsity or impropriety; (2) conclusory assertions of fraud may not constitute plausible unfair or deceptive acts; (3) Chapter 93A claims premised on alleged fraud must meet Rule 9(b); and (4) a plaintiff must specify each defendant’s role in the alleged misconduct — shotgun pleading is impermissible. The court’s decision underscores the pleading standards applicable to Chapter 93A claims — particularly when they sound in fraud — and reinforces that conclusory allegations are insufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge.