In Assured Testing Labs. LLC v. PerkinElmer Health Sciences, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed Chapter 93A claims, holding that the alleged deceptive conduct did not occur “primarily and substantially” in Massachusetts. PerkinElmer Health Sciences, Inc. (PHS) sold instruments to cannabis testing laboratories. Plaintiffs are cannabis testing laboratories that purchased instruments from PHS and its related entities. Plaintiffs brought numerous claims, including fraud and Chapter 93A claims, alleging that PHS misrepresented the capabilities of its tools. PHS moved to dismiss these claims.
The court primarily analyzed whether the conduct that gave rise to the Chapter 93A claim occurred “primarily and substantially” in Massachusetts. Applying the “center of gravity” test, the court emphasized the relevant framework factors: where the defendants committed the alleged deceptive acts and practices, where the plaintiffs received and acted upon the alleged deceptive or unfair statements, and the situs of the plaintiffs’ losses resulting from those acts or practices.
The court dismissed the Chapter 93A claims after finding that the complaint’s Massachusetts-related allegations fell into only five general categories:
- Allegations that certain defendants were headquartered or based in Massachusetts;
- References to Massachusetts regulations or laboratory accreditation standards;
- Allegations that PHS made some sales within Massachusetts (limited to Assured Testing); and
- Bare assertions or statements of Massachusetts law.
The court held that these allegations were insufficient to establish Massachusetts as the center of gravity. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the majority of plaintiffs were not based in Massachusetts; that the specific allegations tied to a location pointed to California and other states; and that the alleged fraud involved a nationwide scheme with sales to laboratories in states other than Massachusetts. The court further emphasized that the location where the recipient of a deception relied upon it is “of particular import” in the center-of-gravity analysis. Because the non-Massachusetts plaintiffs received and acted on the alleged misrepresentations in their respective home states, and suffered losses there, the center of gravity pointed away from Massachusetts, even if some aspects of the scheme were allegedly orchestrated from within the Commonwealth.
The court expressly rejected the argument that PHS’s Massachusetts headquarters, standing alone, could satisfy the “primarily and substantially” requirement. The court observed that plaintiffs failed to plead where misstatements were made, where they were drafted, or where the defendants’ agents were located when making the relevant oral representations. The mere fact that PHS conducted business in Massachusetts did not establish that sales to non-Massachusetts plaintiffs had a meaningful connection to the Commonwealth.
The court also found that plaintiffs’ statement that “the development, implementation, management, and oversight of the fraudulent sales and marketing scheme concerning the Instruments, through PHS’s directors, officers and employees, including those resident Massachusetts employees identified above, occurred primarily and substantially in Massachusetts” was an insufficient, conclusory allegation that merely recited the elements of the cause of action.
This case decision highlights that a defendant’s Massachusetts headquarters or incorporation, without more, does not anchor a Chapter 93A claim to the Commonwealth. Plaintiffs asserting Chapter 93A claims in multi-state fraud cases must identify specific deceptive acts that occurred in Massachusetts, rather than merely alleging that a scheme was managed or overseen from Massachusetts.