In a pair of cases, the District of Massachusetts addressed personal jurisdiction in the context of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93A.
In the first case, Mayur LLC v. Freedom Foods, LLC, No. 1:25-cv-11160-JEK, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 250329 (D. Mass. Dec. 4, 2025), Mayur LLC, d/b/a as Pariva, is a Massachusetts company that produces yogurt snacks. Freedom Foods is a Vermont-based contract manufacturer that makes certain specialty foods. A Chapter 93A dispute arose between the parties, in addition to breach of contract and warranty claims, because mold was found in snacks Freedom Foods manufactured for Pariva. Pariva brought suit in Massachusetts and Freedom Foods moved to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction.
The main issue was whether there was a valid, executed contract between the parties because the location of the formation or breach of a contract is instrumental in determining specific personal jurisdiction. Relatedly, if the alleged contract subjected Freedom Foods to “substantial control and ongoing connection to Massachusetts in the performance of the contract,” this might suffice to exercise personal jurisdiction as well.
The court sidestepped the issue of the existence of a contract when it held “even if such a contract was formed,” there was no evidence that any of its formation occurred in Massachusetts—Pariva visited the Vermont site in connection with the production. Further, the vast majority of obligations, namely production of the snacks, occurred in Vermont. And, the court found that Pariva did not provide any evidence that Freedom Foods’ contacts with Massachusetts were instrumental to any alleged breach of a contract. Thus, there was no formation, performance, or breach the court could use to exercise personal jurisdiction over Freedom Foods.
The court held that Pariva’s failure to sufficiently allege personal jurisdiction in relation to its contract claims also necessarily precluded its Chapter 93A claims. Where a plaintiff does not allege anything distinct in his Chapter 93A claims from his contract claims, the court held that the personal jurisdiction analysis will be the same. Thus, the court dismissed all of Pariva’s claims based on lack of personal jurisdiction.
In the second case, Doane v. Python Leads, LLC, No. 1:24-cv-12947-JEK, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 250334 (D. Mass. Dec. 4, 2025), plaintiff Doane brought suit against defendant Python and its co-founders, who allegedly made repeated, unsolicited calls to Doane, despite his number being on a do-not-call list, and falsely represented to other entities that Doane gave his consent for the calls. Python is based in Florida and operates out of Pakistan. Defendant co-founder Levine is a resident of Florida. Plaintiffs’ claims included federal claims regulating telemarking and a state law Chapter 93A claim for unfair consumer practices. Defendant Levine moved to dismiss the claims against her individually for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.
To evaluate personal jurisdiction, the court first held that Levine intentionally targeted Massachusetts residents and benefited from the company’s calls to Massachusetts consumers. Even if she did not dial the numbers for the specific calls to Doane, her job as the co-founder and CEO was overseeing the operations of the company, which she publicly affirmed multiple times. This was sufficient to show intentionality from her in her individual capacity. She also satisfied the due process requirements of personal jurisdiction because her contacts with Massachusetts through her agents who made the calls have a strong and direct relationship with the claims, Levine purposefully availed herself of the Massachusetts market, and there was nothing fundamentally unfair about her having to litigate the claims in a state where she did not reside. Doane’s Chapter 93A claim also survived a 12(b)(6) motion as the court found it plausibly pled.
These decisions demonstrate that defendants may not be subject to Chapter 93A unless a plaintiff can plead extra territorial jurisdiction.