In AIF Dartmouth, LLC v. Hanson, the Massachusetts Appeals Court considered claims arising from two residential summary-process actions. The landlord sought possession of an apartment, while the tenant asserted several counterclaims, including a claim under Massachusetts General Law Chapter 93A, Section 9. The tenant based her claim on the landlord’s alleged failure to timely repair defective window screens and a patio-door lock and to pay annual interest on her security deposit.

First, the appeals court addressed the landlord’s alleged failure to timely repair the defective window screens and patio-door lock. The trial judge found that the delay breached the implied warranty of habitability and attorney general regulations (940 Code Mass. Regs. § 3.17)that designate delay as unfair or deceptive. Nevertheless, the trial judge declined to find that the regulatory violation constituted an unfair or deceptive practice under Section 2 because COVID-19-related supply chain disruptions and other circumstances impeded the landlord’s efforts to obtain replacement materials. The appellate court held that the trial court judge lacked discretion to reach that conclusion. Because the applicable regulations unambiguously provide that the specified conduct constitutes an unfair or deceptive act, the appeals court held that the regulatory violation itself violated Section 2, regardless of the circumstances.

The appeals court also rejected the landlord’s argument that Chapter 93A relief would duplicate the jury’s award for breach of the warranty of habitability. The appellate judge held that, even if the tenant could not establish additional actual damages, Chapter 93A independently required the trial judge to determine and award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

Second, the appeals court addressed the landlord’s alleged failure to pay annual interest on the tenant’s security deposit, which the trial court held constitutes an unfair or deceptive practice under the regulations. However, the appellate court arrived at a different conclusion, given that the landlord ultimately had paid the interest. As such, the tenant had failed to prove that the regulatory violation had caused an injury under Section 9, as required by Tyler v. Michaels Stores, Inc., where the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) held that even per se violation of Chapter 93A must cause separate, identifiable harm to give rise to claim for damages.

Finally, the appeals court addressed the tenant’s claim for Chapter 93A emotional-distress damages. Although the tenant testified that she experienced anxiety, chest pain, loss of appetite, panic attacks, insomnia, and complications in her recovery from surgery, the trial judge found that she failed to establish a sufficient causal connection between the landlord’s alleged conduct and those claimed injuries, particularly because she did not present supporting medical documentation. The appeals court discerned no clear error in that finding and therefore upheld the denial of emotional-distress damages.

AIF Dartmouth reinforces the distinction between a Section 2 violation arising from a regulatory violation (where the regulation itself deems the conduct at issue unfair or deceptive) and providing that a regulatory violation actually caused harm under Section 9. The appellate judge held that, to prevail on a Chapter 93A, Section 9 claim, a tenant must prove that a Section 2 violation caused injury under Section 9. As the SJC expressly stated in Tyler, violations of Section 2, without more, do not entitle a Section 9 claimant to any damages (nominal or actual) or recovery of attorneys’ fees. Rather, the Section 2 violation — whether by violating an attorney general regulation or not — must cause a separate and distinct injury to expose a respondent to any liability under Section 9.